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Abstract 
This paper seeks to extend the frontier of Hegel’s idealism to confronting environmental problems. While our 
focus is on the theoretical issues bedeviling recent measures to addressing environmental problems, yet we also 
discuss the practical challenges facing environmentalists in getting to the root of the issues that bother them. The 
paper suggests that contemporary environmentalists can borrow much from Hegel’s idealism, especially his 
notion of harmony which his thesis of the absolute depicts. The paper argues, through an appeal to the method of 
dialectical ecologism, that Aldo Leopold and J. Baird Callicott’s land ethic and ecological communitarianism 
respectively could develop strong theoretical base if structured on Hegel’s non-exclusive thesis. Without relying 
on Hegel’s idea of harmony, consciousness and interconnectiveness of beings, we argue that environmentalists’ 
theses cannot be holistic as claimed. 
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1. Introduction 
Problems are usually approached from diverse ways. Also, ideology seems to serve many purposes. To address 
certain problems, scholars tend to adopt different frameworks. In this piece, we hope to apply Hegel’s thought to 
confronting environmental problems. Thus, this paper is partly an exercise in metaphysical exploration, and it is 
partly an engagement in environmental ethics. In its metaphysical aspect, the paper deliberates on Hegel’s 
idealism. In its environmental segment, we turn our attention to Leopold’s land ethic, as well as its enhancement 
in Callicott’s philosophy. Therefore, we are interested in employing Hegel’s idealism to confronting 
environmental problems that have bothered theorists like Leopold and Callicott, among others. 
The concern of this paper then is to raise anew the issue of theoretical foundation upon which environmentalists 
have erected their thesis. In this attempt, we will be defending the position that Leopold and Callicott’s views 
would benefit more if they are constructed on the idea of harmony, consciousness and interconnectivity, which 
Hegel’s idealism focuses on (rather than attempting the absurd). Alluding to Hegel’s metaphysical posture and 
Leopold-Callicottian ecology, we posit that the method of dialectical ecologism is highly needed as a theoretical 
path to tackling environmental crisis that environmentalists are proffering solutions to.  
To come to grips with the above aims, this paper is structured into three sections. The first section discusses 
Hegel’s idealism (and his method of dialectics). The second segment exposes Leopold’s land ethic, and its 
enhancement in Callicott’s ecological communitarianism. The third section shows how Hegel’s view can 
strengthen environmentalists’ tasks. 
 
2. Hegel’s Idealism: A Brief Analysis 
It is a truism that Hegel’s idealism is constructed on the pillar of dialectics. It is also a self-evident truth that at 
the centre of Hegel’s idealism is his doctrine of the Absolute. If the core of Hegel’s idealism is the notion of the 
Absolute (geist), then the question is: What is does the Absolute entail in Hegel’s idealism? This section briefly 
discusses Hegel’s idealism and his principle of dialectics through which the principle of the absolute is 
explicated.  
First, let us point out at the outset that there are different shades of idealism. To be clear, idealism is a branch of 
philosophy that presupposes that consciousness, mind or thought is primary, whereas matter is secondary. 
Idealists do not however share a monolithic view about reality and its nature. Unlike British idealism, Hegel’s 
idealism is tailored in line with German philosophical thought of Fichte and Schelling, which central focus is on 
the universal mind. That is, Hegel’s idealism is one of the views that stresses that progress can only be attained 
in the world if human consciousness or mind is developed on the one hand, and when conflicting thoughts are 
reconciled. It is through the principle of dialectics that he seeks to attain this goal. Hence, idealism, in Hegel’s 
view, is not directed at denying the existence of matter nor is it geared at rejecting the connectivity between the 
real and the rational. What is the focus of this idealism? 
Let us now discuss this idealism. Writing on Hegel’s philosophy, Subrata Mukherjee and Sushila Ramaswamy 
(1999: 249) point out that, for Hegel, “separateness had to be ended by a theory of unity of totality within the 
ambit of reason”. In this case, Hegel identifies that things in the world are not only unorganized, they are 
explained in a way that their interconnectivity is not accounted for. For instance, it is observed that science 
removes thought from practice, in the same way that some scholars have denied the actual. Apparently, 
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philosophical systems before Hegel have either overstressed the existence of matter at the detriment of thought, 
or vice versa. Hegel’s idealism is therefore directed at reconciling the divide between these conflicting thoughts 
concerning reality since he believes that only the reconciliation of contradiction can bring about development. 
Hence, E.K. Ogundowole (2011: 20) notes that, for Hegel, “the world is a totality which is progressing; or 
conversely, progress is of the very essence of the totality, not simply an attribute of some part of it, or of some 
segment of its history…”  
To substantiate this point of view, Hegel’s idealism is structured on his idea of the Absolute Spirit. This thesis 
explains reality as one entity with many-sided angles. Things, to him, have different nature when view from their 
contradicting features, however, the underlying content among these things unify them all. Apparently, all 
existing entities (thought and matter inclusive) are one and the same reality: the absolute. Accordingly, Hegel 
(1977: 479) writes: 
…spirit itself as a whole, and the self-differentiated moments within it, 
fall within the sphere of picture-thinking and in the form of objectivity. 
The content of this picture- thinking is absolute spirit; and all that now 
remains to be done is to supersede this mere form, or rather, since this 
belongs to consciousness as such, its truth must already have yielded 
itself in the shape of consciousness.  
While describing the nature of his system, Hegel (1977: 530) puts it thus: “Consciousness must now grope 
forward to an understanding of objects in the form of self. But it does so by gradual stages, and dirempts itself 
into a number of distinct mental postures in which separate sides of the object are gradually brought together.” 
Therefore, Hegel maintains that, “thought is always in its own sphere its relations are with itself, and it is its own 
object. In having a thought for object, I am at home with myself. The thinking power, the ‘I’, is therefore 
infinite, because, when it thinks, it is in relation to an object which is itself.” 
(www.marxist.org/reference/archive/hegel/works /sl/sl iii.htm). This infinite, speculative thought, or pure 
thought dovetail with the determinate things, hence; the totality of thought and nature is the absolute. Therefore, 
Hegel’s idealism seems to universalize all realities into one, where each reality is an aspect (a part) of the 
totality. To corroborate this stance, Joseph Omoregbe (1991: 131) says that Hegel’s philosophy is centered 
“…around the absolute understood as the totality of being, that is, the whole of reality as one single being.” 
Omoregbe (1991: 133) adds that, “the synthesis of being and non-being is becoming, and that is what the 
absolute is” In his bid to espouse this connectivity of all species, beings or entities, Hegel explores a method 
dialectics. Let us sketchily look at this. 
Hegel adopts the method of dialectics to show how contradictory positions about reality can be resolved. Thus, 
he believes that disorderliness has to be reconciled through a theory of unity of totality. This theory is what he 
calls the absolute spirit. This theory is based on Hegel’s dialectical method. In the words of Samuel E. Stumpf 
and James Fieser (2003: 312), Hegel’s dialectics: 
…exhibits a triadic movement, usually this triadic structure of the 
dialectic process is described as a movement from thesis to antithesis and 
finally to synthesis, after which the synthesis becomes a new thesis, and 
this process continues until it ends in the Absolute idea. What Hegel 
emphasized in his dialectic logic was that thought moves. Contradiction 
does not bring knowledge to a halt, but acts as a positive moving force in 
human reasoning. 
With regard to Hegel’s dialectics, the term ‘contradiction’ or ‘negation’ does not connote a mechanical denial. 
Rather it means a wide variety of relations, difference, reflection or mere insufficiency of a category or 
incoherency. Hence, in his The Science of Logic, he writes: 
…contradiction is, on the other hand, immediately represented in the 
determinations of relationship. The most trivial examples of above and 
below, right and left, father and son, and so on ad infinitum, all contain 
opposition in each term. That is above, which is not below; “above” is 
specifically just this, not to be “below,” and only is in so far as there is a 
“below,” and conversely, each determination implies its opposite (Hegel, 
1969: 441). 
Through his principle of dialectics, he identifies that contradictory elements can be reconciled if we have a 
deeper and broader understanding on how reality develops itself and how contradiction is resolved into a 
synthesis. Thus, the framework of dialectical process is to show how thought and nature acquire this character. 
There are certain fundamental points that Hegel’s dialectics tries to bring out clearly. These points are crucial if 
we are to fully grasp Hegel’s idealism and its usefulness for contemporary social issues. First, Hegel’s idea of 
the absolute seeks to unify or harmonize all realities—matter and thought, nature and man, consciousness and 
fact, etc. Second, Hegel’s dialectics seems to show that the change is triadic on the one hand, and that 
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contradictory thoughts need to be reconciled so as to achieve and development. Third, Hegel seems to project a 
non-exclusive theory of reality where extreme dualistic ideologies are rejected.  
As the foregoing suggests, a study of reality ought to account for the totality, but when particulars are studied it 
is when one has the knowledge of the whole can an adequate knowledge be obtained about the particulars. In this 
respect, Hegel’s idealism suggests that the whole, totality, community or society supersedes the part, hence 
harmony should be pursued through the reconciliation of the parts to the whole.  
It is vital to recount that Hegel presents a communitarian ideology where the parts are not to be isolated from the 
whole if we are to have a robust understanding of reality and development. Therefore, contradictions among the 
parts are to be reconciled through the affirmation of the fact that all existing beings are part of the whole and not 
independent of it. Apparently, the notions of interaction, interrelationship and interdependency of all beings are 
established by Hegel through his notion of the absolute spirit following the sequence of change via the dialectical 
method. In sum, Hegel’s idealism stresses the non-exclusivity of one being at the expense of others. This is the 
ground of harmony that he seeks when he asserts that, “What lies between reason as self-conscious mind and 
reason as an actual world before our eyes, what separates the former from the later and prevents it from finding 
satisfaction in the latter, is the fetter of some abstraction or other which has not been liberated (and so 
transformed) into the concept” (Hegel, 1952: 6).  
Today, societies are bothered with issues of divide between human’s interest and the interest of nature as a 
whole. While there are hundreds of literatures that have discussed Hegel’s solutions to such end, there are few 
papers that have focused on the import of Hegel’s idealism to contemporary efforts to confronting environmental 
issues. This paper seeks to argue that Hegel’s idealism has invaluable import for environmental studies, in the 
sense that his theoretical speculation can be applied to help strengthen the arguments of environmentalists like 
Leopold and Callicott who seek for a holistic cum communitarian basis for extending moral consideration to 
nonhuman natural entities. We shall show how Hegel’s view can help create an internal order for 
environmentalists’ stances in the third segment of this paper. However, before we turn our attention to reflect on 
Leopold and Callicott’s views in the second part of this paper, let us briefly highlight the theoretical footing of 
Hegel’s idealism. First, Hegel suggests consciousness renewal in his idealism. Second, Hegel focuses on the 
whole rather than the part. Third, Hegel stresses the fact of interconnectivity and interdependency of beings. 
Fourth, Hegel identifies a need for change and development. And lastly, Hegel projects a non-exclusive outlook 
and an interdisciplinary approach to knowing where metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, political, social, 
economic and scientific issues are brought under one umbrella—idealism or consciousness. 
So far, what we have attempted in the first section of this paper is a sketch of Hegel’s idealism. Let us not 
proceed to the next segment of the paper where we intend to discuss Leopold and Callicott’s environmental 
theories.  
 
3. Environmental Ethics and Problems: Leopold and Callicott’s Reflections 
Numerous challenges have been observed as threats to the environment. Hence, contemporary scholars have re-
energized the spirit to resolve, once and for all, the entire human (if not natural) causes of environmental 
problems. Whether in the area of beliefs, actions, inventions, ethics or consciousness, emphasis is now placed on 
what could be done to ameliorate the negative effects of humans’ deeds on the environment that have resulted 
into increasing environmental challenges. Today, it is evident that when humans release toxic chemicals into the 
air, water or soil it contaminates the environment which, then, has potency to bring harm on living organisms and 
equally affects the efficiency of the environment. The bid to resolving environment problem is therefore on-
going.  
However, when it comes to how we are to confront it (environmental problems) numerous solutions have been 
suggested. While some scholars advance a technological renewal as a suitable mechanism to combating 
environmental abnormality, some are quick to add that there is a need for a just law/system for ensuring that 
humans are constrained by international environmental guidelines. Yet, there are those like Leopold and Callicott 
who think that without revisiting the traditional anthropocentric consciousness, in the attempt to rekindle 
environmental restoration and activism, only minute success can be realized. It is others’ belief that even when 
anthropocentrism is overcome, it seems crucial for ethical consideration and obligation to be extended to 
nonhumans. In fact, there are clusters of arguments—here and there—on how environmental abnormality can 
successfully be redressed. It is our intent, in this section, to examine one of the eloquently argued perspectives on 
the matter. In this regard, Leopold and Callicott’s environmental theory is our focus. The ideas of David Hume 
and Charles Darwin influenced these scholars.  
To start with, Leopold presents us with an eco-centric solution to environment problems. In this approach, he 
applies ecological lens to environmental concern, thereby arguing for the inclusion of all entities in our moral 
philosophy on the one hand, and a defense of the moral right of the community of all beings (species) on the 
other hand. This view, to be certain, intends to account for the interdependency between human and nonhuman 
natural entities. In other words, Leopold considers ethics as appropriate for addressing environmental problems, 
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but this ethics, to Leopold, requires to be grounded in ecology. According to R. A. Perry (1964: 303), ecology is 
essentially “concerned with populations of organisms and the processes which make for their stability, increase, 
decrease, or replacement by other populations.” 
Leopold is one of the scholars that prioritized the field of environmental ethics. Taking its start in Darwinian 
Theory, the land ethics, portrays by Leopold, seeks to extend moral sentiment that is at the core of social ethics to 
land. Social ethics, as Hume and Darwin have insisted, is directed at restricting anti-social actions. Like these 
scholars, Leopold employs Darwin’s ideas of struggle for life (survival of the fittest) to press home the point that 
humans are definitely tampering on the right to existence of other species. Having subscribed to the guidebooks 
of ecology and evolutionary theory, he maintains that there is a need to extend moral sentiment to nonhumans. 
He writes, “The extension of ethics to this third element in human environment is, if I read the evidence 
correctly, an evolutionary possibility and an ecologically necessity” (Leopold, 1998: 117). This extension of 
ethics to cover nonhuman entity is highly needed, according to him, because, through philosophy, it is now clear 
“…why we cannot destroy the earth with moral impunity; namely, that the “dead” earth is an organism 
possessing a certain kind of degree of life, which we intuitively respect as such” (Leopold, 1979: 140). 
Leopold goes on to add that there is a need for a new ethics (a land ethics), which is not in any way a refutation 
of social ethics, but an extension of its coverage to protect soils, waters, plants and animals. He openly attests 
that this ethics (environmental ethics) is yet to be fully attained and it cannot prevent “…the alteration, 
management, and use of these “resources” but it does affirm their right to continued existence…” (Leopold, 
1998: 118), however, he is skeptical that the intellectual contents of traditional ethical theories are capable of 
being used to pursue this goal. Hence through ecology, Leopold argues that human and nonhumans are equal 
members of the ecological community of interdependent part. And from the standpoint of evolutionary studies, 
Leopold agrees with Darwin that humans are kin to nonhuman species. That is, he drags humans and nonhumans 
into a familial origin. From this, Leopold (1998: 118) maintains that, “In short, a land ethic changes the role of 
Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his 
fellow-members, and also respect for the community as such.” 
To summarize Leopold’s view, it is fundamental that one indicates that he sets a new maxim of morally right 
conduct when he asserts that, “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the 
biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise” (Leopold, 1998: 123). Having postulated a new 
normative principle, Leopold argues that the land ethics seeks to extend philosophical value to all members of 
the land community: soils, waters, rivers, plants, humans etc. etc. The different segments of the land ethics have 
different arguments to support them. As a whole, Leopold is advancing a consciousness change—that is, every 
species should be treated with respect because: (1) ecological studies have revealed the interconnectivity among 
species, (2) humans’ consciousness of superiority over nature is a wrong one, (3) the parts cannot function 
appropriate without the whole seen as working towards a goal, (4) and that there is a need for consciousness 
renewal.  
Leopold’s land ethic has generated many controversies because he does not spell out in greater details the 
ideological foundation of his thesis. Leopold’s land ethic deliberates on certain issues which Callicott 
reformulates, defends and extends. Issues such as: the moral obligation of human to land, the intrinsic value of 
land, land as energy as suggested in Leopold’s land pyramid, moral extensionism to and considerablity of land, 
and the role of ecological conscience as well as consciousness are discussed by Callicott to further reflect on 
Leopold’s environmental ideology. We cannot discuss all the angles to these scholars’ position in this paper. Let 
us comment on the crucial parts. One thing remains fundamental to Leopold’s thought that Callicott intends to 
defend. In trying to defend the land ethic, Callicott does not only employ the themes and concepts of the 
aforementioned scholar, he as well engages in a critical exploration of them, thereby providing a new theory—
ecological communitarian defense of the land ethic—which we shall now discuss. The subsequent paragraphs of 
this section squarely unmask Callicott’s view. 
Thus, Callicott sees the first task of environmental ethicists as identifying that there are certain errors in 
traditional ethical theories that render them not suitable for tackling environmental hurdles. It is Callicott’s idea 
that some assumptions that at the core of social ethics, human ethics, traditional ethics or anthropocentric ethics 
would pre-empt us for getting a better deal out of them. Like Leopold therefore, ethics requires to be wore a new 
garment. Environmentalists must therefore understand, if they are yet to, that social ethics employ certain themes 
which hinder humans’ attempt to get to the root of environmental problems through them. For instance, some 
traditional ethical theories construe humans as master humans master rather than fellow citizen with other 
species. To Callicott’s mind, there is therefore a need to rethink the underlying beliefs of traditional ethical 
approach to resolving environmental concerns. Thus, Callicott, like Leopold, argues that environmental 
philosophy aims at correcting this obnoxious mode-of-seeing or thinking. Therefore, Callicott (1995: 21) posits 
that: 
Environmental philosophers, rather, are attempting to articulate a new 
worldview and a new conception of what it means to be a human 
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being, distilled from the theory of evolution, the new physics, ecology, 
and other natural sciences. On this basis, we might suggests how 
people ought to relate to the natural environment but there is rather 
little deducing of specific rules of conduct. People come to believe that 
old norms (such as stone adulterers and burn witches) should be 
abandoned and new ones adopted (such as abolish slavery and feed the 
hungry) only when their most fundamental ideas about themselves and 
their world undergo radical change. Much of the theoretical work in 
environmental ethics is devoted to articulating and thus helping to 
effect such a radical change in outlook. 
As the foregoing suggests, Callicott is proposing that no valuable change can be realized in the environment 
unless the outlook of people is consciously changed. To effectuate this change, it is problematic to rely on 
traditional metaphysics and ethics because they are at the root of the problem. The solution as Callicott’s 
recommendation shows is to invent or search for new theoretical parts as evident in ecological, evolutionary and 
natural sciences. The foundations of these sciences, as Leopold and Darwin’s ideas provided, enable Callicott to 
provide an internal logic for a new environmental philosophy.  
The first task involves considering the arguments that anthropocentrists have adopted as a basis for dominating 
nonhuman natural entities. Herein, Callicott looks at the issue why intrinsic value is deposited in human but not 
all species. As we would see later, Callicott (1995: 24) argues that, “the claim that all and only human beings 
have intrinsic value may not be consistent with a more general evolutionary and ecological worldview.” The 
second task of activism, as Callicott indicates, is again incomplete without extending ethical sympathy to 
nonhumans. In this respect, he wishes that, at the end, environmental activism will lead to or attain a holistic non-
anthropocentric nature. He thinks that this is significant if we are to purposefully and practically deal with 
environmental hazards. He writes, “The eventual institutionalization of a new holistic, non-anthropocentric 
environmental ethic will make as much practical difference in the environmental arena as the institutionalization 
of the intrinsic value of all human beings has made in the social arena” (Callicott, 1995: 24). 
Neither idea seems likely to yield much success, Callicott contends, if environmental ethicists do not go ahead to 
add that humans should, not only in principle but also in action, have ethical obligation to all sentient and non-
sentient members of the ecological community. Here again, environmental philosophy is doing the unusual. That 
is, Callicott thinks that the third task is that humans should live responsively as well as have duties to protect 
nonhuman natural entities. Environmental ethics seeks to change the status quo and makes anew a new but 
controversial change to our consciousness. Thus he posits that, “Ethics often is rendered paradoxical between 
attitudes, values, and beliefs, on the one hand, and actions, practices, and behavior, on the other hand” (Callicott, 
2009: 163). Hence, it is submitted that all environmentalists should be activists, however, “The way that 
environmental philosophers can be the most effective activists is by doing environmental philosophy” (Callicott, 
1995: 33) and this entails further that: 
In thinking, talking, and writing about environmental ethics, 
environmental philosophers already have their shoulders to the wheel, 
helping to reconfigure the prevailing cultural worldview and thus 
helping to push general practice in the direction of environmental 
responsibility (Callicott, 1995: 33). 
To effectuate environmental responsibility he suggests ecological and evolutionary guidelines as theoretically 
tight as intellectual guide needed for sustained environmental solutions. There are varieties of issues that 
Callicott sets out to resolve either in the land ethics or in the field of environmental philosophy as a whole. He 
tries to address the following questions, though not necessarily raised by him as such: What are the implications 
of Leopold’s land ethics? What are the issues involved in its ethical maxim and considerability criteria? And, 
why must it be that environmental ethics ought to be structured on a holistic non-anthropocentric foundation?  
Firstly, the concern has been raised in some philosophical quarters that Leopold does not sketch out, in the land 
ethic, a model/maxim which allows one to make an ethical choice between two conflicting ethical theories. That 
is, the land ethic does not, at any point, indicate how ethical matters will be resolved when human interests 
conflict with the interests of other members of the ecological community. Put differently, it is argued that there is 
no guideline of action when conflict arises between human and nonhuman interests. Animal liberation ethicist, 
Regan argues, for instance, that Leopold’s land ethics tends towards eco-fascism since Leopold holds that it is 
wrong to mutilate even a single plant, and even at that, it seems suggestive, from Leopold’s account, that it is 
right to reduce human population to ameliorate environmental destruction. If this claim is correct about the land 
ethics, it means then that it advances something which seems ridiculous. On this matter, however, Callicott 
vindicates Leopold’s land ethic from the charge of eco-fascism, and he, other than Leopold, provides two ethical 
criteria (which are products of his ecological communitarian analysis) for resolving any conflict of interests that 
arises between human and nonhuman. Callicott notes, in this respect, that Leopold has pressed it to our hearing 
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that the land ethic is an accretion to the human ethics. This means that the land ethics is not a replacement to the 
social ethics. Rather, it is an addition. Therefore, Callicott (2001: 211) maintains that, “…it is equally evident—
at least to Leopold and his exponents, if not to his critics—that the duties attendant upon citizenship in the biotic 
community (to preserve its integrity, stability and beauty) do not cancel or replace the duties attendant on 
membership in the human global village (to respect human rights).” Thus, Callicott argues that it would be 
erroneous to read into the land ethics, the view that the right to life for every single ecological entity is implied 
since this, in fact, is inconsistent with the structure of the biotic community.  Thus Callicott, Jonathan Parker, et 
al (2011: 140) stress that, ““The only certain truth” of ecology, Leopold observed “is that…creatures must suck 
hard, live fast, and die often. Extending rights to life into the natural world would wreak havoc: it would mean 
protecting prey from predators…” 
However, he grants that Leopold does not explicitly show how conflict of interest between the members of 
human community and biotic community on the one hand, and human community and ecological community on 
the other hand, can be addressed, however, he rejects the views of those who  charge the land ethic for 
ecofascism. He takes it to be a misreading of the land ethic. He then moves on to provide two criteria for making 
ethical choice when members of the ecological community experience conflicting goals. These criteria are absent 
in Leopold’s thought. As one is required to state here, members of the ecological community include: humans, 
animals, plants, trees, waters, soils, or collectively—the land. So, should there is any conflict of interest among 
members of the ecological community which comprises: sentient and non-sentient natural entities, Callicott 
advance two maxims, which he calls Second-Order Principles to prioritizing our actions as well as decisions. 
Callicott (2001: 212) puts it thus: 
By combining two second-order principles we can achieve a priority 
ranking among first-order principle, when, in a given quandary, they 
conflict. The first second-order principle (SOP-1) is that obligations 
generated by membership in more venerable and intimate communities 
take preference over those generated in more recently emerged and 
impersonal communities. The second second-order principle (SOP-2) 
is that the stronger interests (in lack of better word) generate duties 
that take precedence over duties generated by weaker interests. 
The purpose of these second-order principles is to regulate the decision making process when human and 
nonhuman interest conflicts, or when interests among nonhuman species conflicts as well as when duties we have 
to individuals conflict with duties we have to the community as such. SOP-1 gives a preference for species in a 
more venerable and intimate community in both evolutionary and ecological terms than to aliens. For instance, 
Callicott affirms that human community is more venerable when compared to other members of the ecological 
community; hence obligation to humans should take preference over those of other members of the land 
community. SOP-2 takes into consideration interests of species. Callicott seems to think that interests can be 
adjudged stronger and weaker, and it is interests that he ranks first in deciding what our environmental 
responsibilities and duties are to be. Aside this two second-order principles, there are first-order principles that 
our social ethics hints at. Moreover, among these second-order guidelines, Callicott takes SOP-2 to be superior to 
SOP-1 in deciding on what decision we are to make if two first order principles such as: “Honour thy father” and 
“Love your Nation” are in conflict. 
Secondly, Callicott looks closely at the environmental duties and obligations that human memberships in the 
biotic communities [or even ecological community] generate. Before Callicott, answer has been provided by 
Leopold to this issue. Leopold holds that humans are to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of land. Why 
does Leopold think that this is what is needed? Explanation to this will require a brief sketch of how Leopold 
understands ecology anew. The history of ecology has changed a bit. Ecology has been explored along the 
themes of ‘economy of nature,’ ‘balance of nature,’ ‘nature as organism’ and so on. Arthur Tansley thinks that 
there are deficiencies in ecological perception of species as static, that is, nature is not at any time balanced. He 
thus proposes the name ecosystem which, according to him, captures organic and inorganic systems (Newton, 
2006: 170-183). Leopold thinks also that the notion of ‘balance of nature’ does not clearly mirror reality vividly 
along the ecological lens. Leopold (1936: 728) writes: 
To the lay mind, balance of nature probably conveys an actual image 
of the familiar weighing scale. There may even be danger that the 
layman imputes to the biota properties which exist only on the 
grocer’s counter. To the ecological mind, balance of nature has merits 
and also defects. Its merits are that it conceives of a collective total, 
that it implies some utility to all species, and that it implies oscillations 
when balance is disturbed. Its defects are that is only one point at 
which balance occurs and the balance is normally static. 
Following from Leopold’s citation above and his treatment of ecological change in the “Land Pyramid” section 
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of the land ethic, Callicott identifies that Leopold employs the concept of ecological change (flux) rather than 
that of balance. However, it seems clear that Leopold’s maxim, to Callicott, is far from being carefully theorized 
since it has within it a contradiction. Callicott (2002: 100) holds that, “Leopold knew that conservation must aim 
at a moving target. How can we conserve a biota that is dynamic, ever changing, when the very words 
“converse” and “preserve”—especially when linked to “integrity” and “stability”—connote arresting change””. 
Against this backdrop, Callicott insists that this poser needs to be revised or “dynamized” as he puts it. To solve 
this conundrum, Callicott introduces the concept of scale. In Callicott’s words: 
Leopold was keenly aware that nature is dynamic, but, under the sway 
of mid-century equilibrium ecology, he conceived of natural change 
primarily in evolutionary, not in ecological, terms. Nevertheless, scale 
is equally normative when ecological change is added to evolutionary 
change, that is, when normal climatic oscillations and patch dynamics 
are added to normal rates of extinction, hybridization, and speciation 
(Callicott, 2002: 100). 
Callicott clearly affirms the existence of paradigms shift in ecological development from the balance of nature to 
that of flux of nature and this, to him, does not hinder the land ethics, however, he thinks that there is a need to 
alter the moral maxim postulated by Leopold  (1998: 123-124) which suggests that, “A thing is right when it 
tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise” 
to the one which indicates that, “A thing is right when it tends to disturb the biotic community only at normal 
spatial and temporal scales. It is wrong when it tends otherwise” (Callicott, 2001: 216). Evidently, he transposes 
Leopold’s ethical criterion to indicate, first, that environmental disturbances are natural (that is, there are 
disasters that are not directly or indirectly caused by humans, which suggests that the notion of stability is 
misconstrued by conservatists) and to establish that, second, it is the rate of humans’ alteration on the 
environment that raises the ethical concern in the first place. Callicott (2001: 215) observes that, “Long before 
Homo sapiens evolved, violent disturbances regularly occurred in nature. And they still occur, quite 
independently of human agency” but, “problem with anthropogenic disturbances—such as industrial forestry and 
agriculture, exurban development, drift net-fishing—is that they are far more frequent, widespread, and regularly 
occurring than are non-anthropogenic disturbances…” (Callicott, 2001: 215). 
Thirdly, Callicott believes that through the ‘community’ and ‘kinship’ concepts that are deducible from ‘ecology’ 
and ‘evolutionary’ sciences respectively, it will be convincing to advance a land ethics to provide a moral 
standing to all species, just as social ethics has been employed to provide moral consideration to all humans. Like 
Leopold, Callicott refers to the concept of intrinsic and inherent values to negate the subordination of nonhuman 
interests to economic gains of humans. He, like Leopold, then see the urgent task of environmentalists ad that of 
rejecting human centeredness mode of thinking that reduces land to mere soil to be use for economic gain. To 
resolve environmental crises therefore, both Leopold and Callicott advance (1) moral considerability of land, (2) 
respect to land and all the members of the ecological community, (3) development of ecological conscience, (4) 
application of new theoretical lens rather than traditional applied ethical theories, and (5) given much roles to 
private individuals in conservative management.  
The land ethics has been a guidebook or compendium on environmental ethics since the days of Leopold. It is 
without doubt one of the best works on environmental ethics. Although it should not be overrated since many 
problems are yet to be completely resolved in it. Many writers have indeed showed the negative aspects of 
Leopold’s thought, even after it has been reworked by Callicott. Darren Domsky and Eric R. Horn’s Criticisms 
are intriguing and constructive. We are not interested in pointing at all the problems that other scholars have 
identified in Leopold’s land ethics in this piece. Rather, we are interested in showing how the land ethics can 
develop better theoretical foundation from the mixture of Hegel’s dialectics and Leopold-Callicottian ecological 
lens to yield a methodical footing that we shall call ‘Dialectical ecologism.’ It is through this method that we 
seek to show the import of Hegel’s view on contemporary attempt to resolve environmental concerns.   
 
4.  The Theoretical Import of Hegel’s Idealism on Environmental Issues 
There are number of ways that Hegel’s idealism can provide internal order for environmental ethicists’ position, 
especially Leopold and Callicott’s theories that have resemblance with Hegel’s idealism in certain respects. As it 
is vital to stress, here, that both Hegel and the exponents of land ethics are interested in showing how human 
actions can be carried out in a way that contradictions are in thought and actions are resolved. It is vital also to 
note that contradiction is the thrust of idealism and environmental ethics. Hegel, for instance, seeks to remove 
contradictions in the way which reality is conceived on the one hand, and in the use to which nature is put to on 
the other. Environmentalists are interested on how humans’ erroneous world outlook about their place in the 
scheme of things can be corrected in a way that they will be helped to see clearly that all entities have roles to 
play in the scheme of things and that no idea of superiority can be justified. Thus, to pursue the interest of one 
entity or species (man) at the detriment or expense of another (nature) is therefore to advance the importance of 
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the part over the whole. This, to Hegel, is a misconception, and detrimental to attaining progress. 
The emphasis of Hegel, like that of Leopold and Callicott, is to ignite the intellectual consciousness in us that the 
interest of the whole is to be considered if meaningful change is to be realized. However, if one stresses that a 
particular entity is superior to others, this ought, as a matter of fact, not to lead to the extinction of its 
contradiction. Going by this, the issue of consciousness being the major tool for social reconstruction becomes 
necessary. But what kind of education can resolve the dialectical tension that subsists between human and nature, 
and matter and consciousness? Suggestions to this question have been provided by Hegel and Leopold. Whereas 
Hegel seems to suggest the Absolute thesis where contradictions are united in an harmonious way wherein the 
parts are not destroyed but reconciled into the whole, Leopold employs ecological lens to show that each species, 
which is in conflict with other species, needs other species to survive. The lesson here is that it will be dangerous, 
in the practical sense, to think that humans are above nature, and that they have rights to use up the world’s 
resources. It is erroneous to think that human can live without nonhumans. How is this possible? It is ever wrong, 
we think, to pollute the environment even if such pollution will not harm humans. However, for Hegel, what is 
needed is consciousness renewal.  
The point therefore comes more vivid when we observe that we cannot do without plants and animals. Thus, we 
live and have our existence on them, for without them man’s existence is an illusion. As Paul Sheppard (1973: 
550) rightly says that, “Man is in the world and his ecology is the nature of that inness.” We cannot live long if 
we continue to live as if pollution and global warming are not capable of putting us out of life. Whether this 
point is seen as anthropocentric or not, one thing we need to add is that in it—the logical tie with non-human 
beings is evident. All environmental ethics therefore is anthropocentric in a sense, but because we are attempting 
to save other species—the extension is non-anthropocentric. Thus, there is no contradiction involved in saying 
that we are advancing both positions. What seems fundamental is that the non-anthropocentric perspective is 
more robust. However, it is advanced from the point of view of man. We are seeking for a better approach to 
save the world; hence our worldview should be at most more humane, more logical and more fruitful. 
Man and nature are part of the ecological community. Hence, the way man thinks about nature is how he will 
relate with it. Since theory; as we have posited, must be brought to life, our worldview about reality ought to be 
improved if we are to resolve practical environmental problems. It is a theory that suggests that consciousness 
and the actual are interconnected that can provide a guide to good environmental thesis. This is the view that lies 
assessable in Hegel’s idealism. The idea of man versus nature should be resolved. Thus, the interconnectivity of 
man and nature should be stressed, and this is what Hegel describes as the absolute, whereas Leopold advances 
same with ecology. It is apposite that we affirm that the understanding of our environment requires the 
understanding of Leopoldian ecological relation of man to land. This relation is primarily to be looked at from 
the standpoint of ideology or consciousness remodel, rather than by advancing a new ethics, a theory of intrinsic 
right of nature or a theory of moral considerability to land has Leopold and others have done. The purpose of 
ecology to us is to enable us see the chain or connection among species and how one thing depends on the other 
for survival. The idea of Hegel shows this organic relation among beings clearly. Thus, Hegel’s thesis of the 
absolute is the totality of reality seen in their interconnectedness. As the foregoing indicates, the lesson that one 
could bring forth is that considerable effort should be made to see reality in this light. It is after this has been 
done can we attempt a consciousness renewal. We have capacity to change our way of looking as thinking 
beings and this is what is important in environmental studies. Thus, Callicott (2011: 127) posits that, “We are 
thinking animals; if not uniquely thinking animals, then certainly, among all animals; we specialize and excel in 
thinking.” There is a need to bring forth the ecological way of seeing to fully grapple with the problems that 
assail us. Sheppard (1973: 551) writes: 
And so ecology as applied to man faces the task of renewing a balanced 
view where now there is man-centeredness, even pathology of isolation and 
fear. It implies that we must find room in “our” world for plants and 
animals, even for their togetherness and their opposition. It further implies 
exploration and openness across an inner boundary- an ego boundary- and 
appreciative understanding of the animal in ourselves which our heritage of 
Platonism, Christian morbidity, duality, and mechanism have long held 
repellent and degrading. 
How do we advance this philosophy that would largely be result-oriented? To answer this question, we think that 
there is limit to what a single theory or people can do. This paper is therefore advancing a dialectical ecology as 
one of the plausible answers in environmental ethics and it is an attempt to complement other works on 
environmental activism. Dialectical ecology affirms on the one hand, that man and nature are interconnected. 
This connectivity of man to nature indicates that phenomena of nature or reality are not in isolation and should 
not lead to mutual exclusion. This presupposes that reality ought to be conceived in this manner. Here, we are 
advancing a view similar to Hegel’s method that the reconciliation process should be a form of settlement, 
agreement or harmony in reality. This settlement arises from the fact that nature or man cannot stand on its own 
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without other realities. As we have argued above, the dissimilarity between anthropocentric and non-
anthropocentric philosophy lies in their way of seeing. Consciousness renewal is therefore what is needed for 
friendly environment. Dialectics therefore enables us to grasp the interconnectivity among species, whereas 
ecology relates this interdependency to human and natural concerns.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
This paper has attempted an exploration of Hegel’s idealism to resolving contemporary environmental concerns. 
It this bid, we considered the import of Hegel’s idealism to Leopold and Callicott’s environmental ethics, 
thereby showing the connections between idealism and environmental ethics. The paper concluded that Hegel’s 
idealism is invaluable to confronting recent environmental hurdles that the land ethic is aimed at resolving 
without involving itself in absurd conclusion that nonhuman species have intrinsic value. 
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